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Abstract
Graph neural networks (GNNs) have achieved state-of-the-art performance in many
graph-related tasks, e.g., node classification. However, recent works show that GNNs are
vulnerable to evasion attacks, i.e., an attacker can perturb the graph structure to fool
trained GNN models. Existing evasion attacks to GNNs have two key drawbacks. First,
perturbing the graph structure to fool GNN models is essentially a binary optimization
problem, while it is often solved via approximate algorithms with sub-optimal solutions.
Second, existing attacks are only applicable to two-layer GNNs.
In this paper, we aim to address the above drawbacks and propose to attack GNNs
via influence function, a completely different perspective from existing works. Specifically,
we first build the connection between GNNs and label propagation in terms of influence
function. Then, instead of solving an approximate algorithm, we reformulate the attack to
be related to (label) influence, which is applicable to multi-layer GNNs and whose solution
can be calculated directly. We evaluate our attack on various benchmark graph datasets.
Experimental results demonstrate that, compared to state-of-the-art attack, our attack
can achieve higher attack success rate and has a 10-100x speedup when attacking two-layer
GNNs. Moreover, our attack is also very effective to attack multi-layer GNNs.
1 Introduction
Graph neural network (GNN) is an emerging technique that is widely used to handle graph-
related problems. GNN was first introduced in [6], which extended conventional neural net-
work to process data represented in the graph domain. GNN has achieved state-of-the-art
performance in many graph-related tasks such as node classification [4, 8, 11], graph classifi-
cation [3, 2], link prediction [13], etc. In this paper, we consider GNN for node classification.
However, GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Existing attacks have several key
limitations: First, most of them are designed for two-layer GNN, especially two layer-GCN.
They cannot be directly applied to multiple-layer GNN. Second, existing attacks convert the
challenging binary optimization problem to be a relaxed continuous problem, whose solutions
are sub-optimal. Third, existing attacks are inefficient.
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2 Background
2.1 Graph Neural Network
Let G = (V, E ,X) be a graph, where u ∈ V is a node, (u, v) ∈ E is an edge between u and v,
and X = [x1; x2; · · · ; xn] ∈ Rn×d is the node feature matrix. We denote A as the adjacency
matrix, where Au,v = 1, if (u, v) ∈ E and Au,v = 0, otherwise; Moreover, we denote du and
Γu as u’s node degree and the neighborhood set of u (including self-loop (u, u)). We consider
GNNs for node classification in this paper. In this context, each node u ∈ V has a label yu
from a label set Y = {1, 2, · · · , C}. Given a set of VL ⊂ V labeled nodes {(xu, yu)}u∈VL as the
training set, GNN for node classification is to take the graph G and labeled nodes as input
and learn a GNN node classifier that maps each node u ∈ V \ VL to a class y ∈ Y.
Generally speaking, GNN consists of two main steps: neighborhood aggregation and node
representation update. Suppose a GNN has K layers. We denote v’s representation in the
k-th layer be h
(k)
v , with h
(0)
v = xv. In neighborhood aggregation, GNN obtains an aggregated
representation l
(k)
v by aggregating representations of v’s neighbors in the (k − 1)-th layer as
follows:
l(k)v = AGG
({
h(k−1)u : u ∈ Γv
})
. (1)
In node representation update, GNN updates v’s representation at the k-th layer via parame-
terizing the aggregated representation l
(k)
v with parameters matrix W(k) as follows:
h(k)v = UPDATE
(
l(k)v ,W
(k)
)
. (2)
Different GNNs use different AGG and UPDATE functions. Moreover, a GNN having K layer
involves K iterations of neighborhood aggregation and node representation update. Then, a
node v’s final representation h
(K)
v ∈ R|Y| can capture the structural information of its K-hop
neighbors. The final node representations of training nodes are used for training a GNN node
classifier.
In this paper, we mainly consider two GNNs, i.e., Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) [4]
and Simple Graph Convolution (SGC) [10].
2.1.1 GCN.
GCN is motivated by spectral graph convolution [1]. In GCN, AGG is the element-wise mean
pooling function and UPDATE is the ReLU activation function. More specific, it has the
following form:
h(k)v = ReLU
(
W(k)
( ∑
u∈Γv
d−1/2u d
−1/2
v h
(k−1)
u
))
,
or in a matrix form
H(k) = ReLU(A˚H(k−1)W(k)), (3)
where A˚ is a normalization of A and is defined as A˚ = D˜−1/2A˜D˜−1/2, where A˜ = A + I, D˜
is a diagonal matrix with D˜i,i = (
∑
j A˜(i, j)), and H
(0) = X. For a K-layer GCN, we denote
Θ = {W(1), · · · ,W(K)} and denote its output as ZΘ = fGCNΘ (A) = softmax(H(K)) ∈ R|V |×|Y|,
2
where ZΘv,y indicates the probability of node v begin class y. The parameters Θ are learnt by
minimizing the cross-entropy loss on the outputs of the training nodes VL, i.e.,
Θ∗ = arg min
Θ
−
∑
v∈VL
ln ZΘv,yv . (4)
With the learnt Θ∗, we can predict the label for each unlabeled nodes u ∈ V \ VL as yˆu =
arg maxi Z
Θ∗
u,i .
2.1.2 SGC.
SGC is a linearized version of GCN. SGC has the same neighborhood aggregation function as
GCN, but its node representation is updated as follows:
H(k) = A˚H(k−1)W(k). (5)
Similarly, we have the SGC node classifier fSGC . SGC has shown to have comparable node
classification performance with GCN, but is much more efficient than GCN.
2.2 Label Propagation
Label Propagation (LP) [14] is a conventional semi-supervised node classification method with-
out training. The key idea behind LP is that two nodes having a high similarity (e.g., connected
nodes in a graph) are likely to have the same label. Thus, LP iteratively propagates labels
among the graph to unlabeled nodes based on node-pair similarity. Let Y = [y1; y2; · · · ,y|V|] ∈
R|V |×|Y| be the initial label matrix, where yv is the one-hot label vector for v and yv = 0 if v
is an unlabeled node. Then, LP is formulated as follows:
Y(k) = D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2Y(k−1), Y(0) = Y. (6)
With K iterations, an unlabeled node u is predicted to be class-c, if c = arg maxi Y
(K)
u,i .
2.3 Evasion Attacks to GNNs
In this paper, we consider targeted evasion attacks1 to GNNs for node classification. Suppose
we are given a trained GNN node classifier fΘ∗ . We assume v is the target node and c is the
target label. We consider an attacker can perturb the graph structure (i.e., add new edges to
or delete existing edges from the graph) so as to fool the GNN node classifier, i.e., predicting
the target node to be the target label. We also call the perturbed edges as attack edges. In
particular, we assume a more practical direct attack [15, 9], i.e., an attacker can only modify
the connection status between the target node v and other nodes in the graph, while cannot
modify the connection status among other nodes. We denote the perturbed graph as G˜ (with
the associated perturbed adjacency matrix A˜) after the attack and attack budget as ∆, i.e., at
most ∆ edges can be perturbed for the target node. Then, the objective function of targeted
evasion attacks to GNNs is formally defined as:
max
A˜
(
fΘ∗(A˜)v,c − fΘ∗(A˜)v,yv
)⇔ max
A˜v
(
[h˜(K)v ]c − [h˜(K)v ]yv
)
,
s.t.,
∑
s
|A˜v,s −Av,s| ≤ ∆, (7)
where h˜
(K)
v is v’s representation on the perturbed graph G˜.
1As untargeted attacks are less powerful than targeted attacks, we only consider targeted attacks in this
paper for simplicity
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Equation 7 is a binary optimization problem and is challenging to solve in practice. For
instance, Zu¨gner et al. [15] proposed an attack method, called Nettack, against two-layer
GCN. However, when designing the attack, the authors relaxed the two-layer GCN’s objective
function by removing its ReLU activation function (thus reducing to be two-layer SGC).
3 Our Influence-based Attack
In this section, we propose our influence-based attack. In contrast to existing optimization-
based attacks that are solved based on approximation algorithms and can be only applied to
two-layer GNNs, our attack is designed via directly calculating the influence, which is inspired
by [5, 12], and is applicable to multi-layer GNNs. Specifically, we first define feature influence
and label influence on GNNs and LP, respectively. Then, we build the connection between
GNNs (specifically GCN and SGC) and LP based on the influence. Next, we equally convert
the attack’s objective function related to final node representation in GNNs to that related to
label influence in LP. As label influence is associated with computing the label propagation
in Equation 6, it is efficient to be calculated as it does not involve multiplying the model
parameters Θ as in GNNs. Finally, we design two algorithms to implement our attack.
3.1 Influence Function
Given two nodes u and v, an influence of u on v indicates how the output (e.g., final node
representation in GNNs or final estimated node label in LP) of v changes if the input of u is
slightly perturbed [5, 12]. Here, we first define two influence functions, i.e., feature influence
and label influence, associated with GNNs and LP, respectively.
Feature-label influence. The feature-label influence of node u on node v on a K-layer GNN
is defined as follows:
If (v, u;K) =
∥∥∥(∂h(K)v
∂h
(0)
u
)
yu
∥∥∥
1
= 1Tyu [
∂h
(K)
v
∂h
(0)
u
]1, (8)
where 1yu = [y1, y2, · · · , yn] is the indicator vector where yi = 1 if i = u and yi = 0, otherwise.
1 is an all-one vector.
Label influence. The label influence of node u on node v after K iterations of label propa-
gation is defined as follows:
Il(v, u;K) =
∂y
(K)
v
∂y
(0)
u
. (9)
Next, we build the connection between GNNs and LP in terms of influence.
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3.2 Connection between GNNs and LP via Influence
We first span the node representation h
(K)
v using the chain rule. That is,
h(K)v = W
(K)( ∑
u∈Γv
d
− 1
2
v d
− 1
2
u h
(K−1)
u
)
= W(K)W(K−1)
( ∑
u∈Γv
∑
z∈Γu
d
− 1
2
v du
−1dz
− 1
2h(K−2)z
)
,
= · · ·
=
∑
u∈Γ˜(K)v
Ψv→u∑
p=1
1∏
l=K
d
− 1
2
vlp
d
− 1
2 vpl−1 ·W(l) · h(0)u ,
=
∑
u∈Γ˜(K)v
Ψv→u∑
p=1
1∏
l=K
a
vlp,v
l−1
p
·W(l) · h(0)u . (10)
Here, Γ˜
(K)
v =
{
Γ
(1)
v ,Γ
(2)
v , · · · ,Γ(K)v
}
is the node set that contains all nodes within the K-hop
of v. Γ
(k)
v denotes the k-hop neighborhood of the node v, and Γ
(1)
v = Γv. Ψv→u is the total
number of paths [vKp , v
K−1
p , · · · , v1p, v0p] of length k+1 from node v to the node u where vKp = v
and v0p = u. For l = 1, · · · ,K, avlp,vl−1p = dvlp
− 1
2dvl−1p
− 1
2 is the normalized weight of the edge
(vlp, v
l−1
p ) in the path p.
Moreover, based on Equation (10), we can obtain the derivative ∂h
(K)
v
∂h
(0)
u
as follows:
∂h
(K)
v
∂h
(0)
u
=
Ψv→u∑
p=1
1∏
l=K
avlp,v
l−1
p
·W(l). (11)
According to Equation (10) and Equation (11), hkv can be expressed by
∂h
(K)
v
∂h
(0)
u
, which is denoted
as
h(K)v =
∑
u∈Γ˜(K)v
∂h
(K)
v
∂h
(0)
u
· h(0)u . (12)
Based on Equation (11) and , the feature-label influence in Equation (8) can be further
expressed as follows:
If (v, u;K) = 1
T
yu [
∂h
(K)
v
∂h
(0)
u
]1
= 1Tyu [
1∏
l=K
W (l) ·
Ψv→u∑
p=1
1∏
l=K
avlp,v
l−1
p
]1
= 1Tyu [
1∏
l=K
W (l)]1 ·
Ψv→u∑
p=1
1∏
l=K
avlp,v
l−1
p
= C ·
Ψv→u∑
p=1
1∏
l=K
avlp,v
l−1
p
,
(13)
where C = 1Tyu [
∏k
l=1 W
(l)]1 is a constant for a trained GCN model. Comparing SGC with LP,
we can find their iteration processes are similar, except that the LP has no model parameters
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Table 1: Dataset statistics.
Dataset #Nodes #Edges #Features #Classes
Cora 2,708 5,429 1,433 7
Citeseer 3,327 4,732 3,703 6
Pubmed 19,717 44,338 500 3
(which is constant for a trained GNN model). Thus, we can update the label influence Il
according to Equation (10):
Il(v, u;K) =
∂y
(K)
v
∂y
(0)
u
=
∑
u∈Γ˜(K)v
∑Ψv→u
p=1
∏1
l=K avlp,v
l−1
p
· y(0)u
∂y
(0)
u
=
Ψv→u∑
p=1
1∏
l=K
avlp,v
l−1
p
.
(14)
Hence, we can build the following relationship between the feature-label influence in GNN
and label influence in LP:
If (v, u;K) = C · Il(v, u;K). (15)
According to the relationship above, we can exploit the label influence to aggregate the neigh-
bors’ features of the target node so that the classifier can be fooled into misclassifying the
target node’s label.
3.3 Complexity and Algorithm flow
In this section, we will discuss the algorithm flow of the iterative algorithm and one-time
algorithm, also including their algorithm flow. Corresponding to the target attack, we select
M sample points from the graph as the attack object, and count the percentage of successful
attacks and the average number of attack samples after the attack. For a single target node
v, we need to first calculate the label influence of the original second-order path, which is the
C0 term in Equation (??). Then calculate the label influence of the first-order path of the
yv-label and c-label node in the candidate nodes set CNa and CNr respectively. We count
the total number of nodes in CNa and CNr as Γ, and the average degree of nodes as d. At
the same time, the number of adversarial samples for each sample point does not exceed ∆.
The complexity of the one-time algorithm can easily be determined as O((d2 + d · Γ)). Since
the optimal adversarial sample is re-selected each time in the iterative algorithm, the time
complexity is O(∆ · (d2 + d · Γ)). The following will introduce the iterative algorithm and the
one-time algorithm respectively
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4 Evaluation
4.1 Experimental setup
4.1.1 Datasets.
Following existing works [15], we use three benchmark citation graphs (i.e., Cora, Citeseer, and
Pubmed) [7] to evaluate our attack. In these graphs, each node represents a documents and
each edge indicates a citation between two documents. Each document treats the bag-of-words
feature as the node feature vector, and has a label as well. Table 1 shows basic statistics of
these citation graphs.
4.1.2 Training nodes and target nodes.
We use the training nodes to train GNN models and use the target nodes to evaluate attacks
against the trained GNN models. Specifically, we randomly sample 20 nodes from each class
as the training nodes; and we randomly sample 100 nodes that are correctly classified by each
GNN model as the target nodes. Similar to Nettack [15], for each target node, we choose the
predicted label by the GNN model with a second largest probability as the target label.
4.1.3 Compared attacks.
We compare our attack with the state-of-the-art Nettack [15] for attacking GCN and SGC. Note
that Nettack is only applicable to attack two-layer GCN/SGC, while our attack is applicable to
multi-layer GCN/SGC. Our attack has two versions: one-time attack and iterative attack. In
addition, when computing the label influence, our attack needs to know the labels of unlabeled
nodes in the graph. When the true labels are unknown, we can query the learnt GCN/SGC
model to estimate labels for unlabeled nodes and use the estimated labels as the true labels.
Thus, there are four variants of our attack. We note that Nettack cannot leverage the label
information of unlabeled nodes. Our four attacks are as follows:
• OTA-KL. This is one-time attack and we know the true labels of unlabeled nodes.
• OTA-UL. This is one-time attack but we are unknown to the true labels. In this case,
we first query the GNN model to obtain the predicted labels of unlabeled nodes; and
treat the predicted labels as the true labels.
• Iter-KL. This is iterative attack and we know the true labels of unlabeled nodes.
• Iter-UL. This is iterative attack but we are unknown to the true labels. We adopt the
same way as OTA-UL to obtain the labels for unlabeled nodes.
We test Nettack using the open source code2. We implement our attack in PyTorch. All
experiments are conducted on a Linux server with 128GB memory and 12 cores.
4.1.4 Evaluation metric.
We adopt attack success rate and running time as the metrics to evaluate all attacks. Given
an attack budget ∆, attack success rate is the fraction of target nodes that are misclassified
to be the target label when the number of attack edges per target node is at most ∆.
2https://github.com/danielzuegner/nettack
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Figure 1: Attack success rate vs. attack budget per target node on a 2-layer GCN
of all compared attacks on the three graphs.
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Figure 2: Attack success rate vs. attack budget per target node on a 2-layer SGC
of all compared attacks on the three graphs.
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Figure 3: Running time vs. attack budget per target node on 2-layer GCN of all
compared attacks on the three graphs.
4.2 Experimental results
4.2.1 Results on attacking two-layer GNNs.
In this experiment, we compare our attacks with Nettack in terms of effectiveness (i.e., attack
success rate) and efficiency (i.e., running time) against two-layer GCN/SGC. Figure 1 and
Figure 2 show the attack performance of all compared attacks vs. attack budget per attack
node against GCN and SGC on the three citation graphs, respectively. Moreover, Figure 3
and Figure 4 show the running time of all compared attacks vs. attack budget per attack node
against GCN and SGC on the three citation graphs, respectively. We have the following key
observations.
1) Our attacks are more effective than Nettack. For instance, when attack budget per
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Figure 4: Running time vs. attack budget per target node on 2-layer SGC of all
compared attacks on the three graphs.
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Figure 5: Attack success rate of OTA-KL/OTA-UL vs. attack budget per node
against four-layer GCN on the three graphs.
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Figure 6: Attack success rate of OTA-KL/OTA-UL vs. attack budget per node
against four-layer SGC on the three graphs.
attack node is XX, our one-time attacks can obtain the attack success rate of XX, XX, and
XX, on the three graphs, respectively, while Nettack obtains the attack success rate of XX, XX,
and XX, respectively. There are two possible reasons. First, Nettack is an optimization-based
attack that is solved via an approximate algorithm, which could lead to a suboptimal solution.
However, our attack directly computes the influence of each other node on the target node
and finds the optimal nodes that can fool the GNN model. Second, Nettack cannot leverage
the label information of unlabeled nodes, while our attack can incorporate such important
information.
2) Our one-time attack and iterative attack (OTA-KL vs. Iter-KL and OTA-UL vs. Iter-
UL) have comparable attack performance. For instance, the difference of the attack success
rate between the two attacks is less than XX% on all the three graphs. This demonstrates
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Figure 7: Running time of OTA-KL/OTA-UL vs. attack budget per node against
four-layer GCN on the three graphs.
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Figure 8: Running time of OTA-KL/OTA-UL vs. attack budget per node against
four-layer SGC on the three graphs.
that, although simple, one-time attack is already very effective. However, one-time attack is
much more efficient than iterative attack.
3) Our attacks with unknown labels achieve comparable performance with those with known
labels. There are two reasons. This is because the trained GNN model has very accurate
predictions on the unlabeled nodes, and thus most of the predicted labels match the ground
truth labels.
4) Our one-time attack is much more efficient than Nettack. Specifically, it takes 1-2 orders
of less time for our OTA-KL and OTA-UL than that of Nettack. This is because our attack is
performed by directly computing the influence, while Nettack needs to solve an optimization
problem.
4.2.2 Results on attacking multi-layer GNNs.
In this experiment, we evaluate our attack against multi-layer GCN/SGC. Note that Nettack
is not applicable in this case. For conciseness, we only show results with our one-time attack,
as it demonstrates comparable performance with our iterative attack. Figure 5 and Figure 6
show the attack success rate vs. attack budget per target node against four-layer GCN and
four-layer SGC on the three graphs, respectively. We observe that our one-time attack with
both known label and unknown label are very effective. For instance, when the attack budget
per target node is 6, our attack can achieve an attack success rate of greater than 80% on all
cases.
Moreover, Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the running time vs. attack budget per target against
4-layer GCN/SGC on the three graphs, respectively. Our attack is also efficient. For instance,
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Table 2: Transferability of our OTA-KL against 2-layer GCN/SGC to other GNNs
on the three citation graphs. Attack budget per target node is 6.
Dataset Source GNN Untarget-KL GNN
Cora
GCN
GCN SGC GAT JK-Net
0.92 0.92 0.86 0.92
SGC
SGC GCN GAT JK-Net
0.92 0.89 0.83 0.89
Citeseer
GCN
GCN SGC GAT JK-Net
0.91 0.91 0.87 0.78
SGC
SGC GCN GAT JK-Net
0.9 0.9 0.82 0.78
Pubmed
GCN
GCN SGC GAT JK-Net
0.89 0.87 0.83 0.89
SGC
SGC GCN GAT JK-Net
0.88 0.87 0.84 0.87
when the attack budget per target node is 6, it takes our attack less than Xs to attack a target
node.
4.2.3 Transferring our attack to other GNNs.
In this experiment, we aim to study the transferability of our attacks, i.e., whether the attack
edges generated by our attacks against the GCN/SGC model are also effective for other GNN
methods. Specifically, we use our attacks to generate the attack edges for each target node
by attacking the source GNN (GCN or SGC) model, change the graph structure based on the
attack edges, and adopt a target GNN (i.e., SGC/GAT/JK-Net for GCN; to classify each target
node on the perturbed graph. We select two other representative GNNs, i.e., GAT [8] and JK-
Net [12], as the target models. If the target node is also misclassified by the target GNN, we
say the attack edges generated by the source GNN for this target node are transferable.
Table 3 shows the attack success rate of transferring of our OTA-UL against 2-layer
GCN/SGC to attack other GNNs on the three graphs, where the attack budget per target
node is 6. We observe that our attack has a very promising transferability. Specifically, on
all the three graphs, the difference of the attack success rate between attacking the source
GNN and attacking the target GNN is marginal (i.e., less than 5% in almost all cases). This
indicates that almost all the attack edges generated by our attack on the source GNN can
be transferred to attack the target GNNs. Such good transferability further demonstrates the
advantages of using (label) influence to perform the evasion attacks.
5 Conclusion
We propose an evasion attack against GNNs via influence function. Specifically, we first build
the connection between GNNs and label propagation in terms of influence function. Then, we
reformulate the attack to be related to (label) influence, which is applicable to multi-layer GNNs
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Table 3: Transferability of our OTA-UL against 2-layer GCN/SGC to other GNNs
on the three citation graphs. Attack budget per target node is 6.
Dataset Source GNN Untarget-UL GNN
Cora
GCN
GCN SGC GAT JK-Net
0.92 0.92 0.86 0.91
SGC
SGC GCN GAT JK-Net
0.92 0.89 0.85 0.91
Citeseer
GCN
GCN SGC GAT JK-Net
0.93 0.93 0.9 0.89
SGC
SGC GCN GAT JK-Net
0.95 0.95 0.92 0.9
Pubmed
GCN
GCN SGC GAT JK-Net
0.89 0.87 0.84 0.88
SGC
SGC GCN GAT JK-Net
0.87 0.87 0.83 0.86
and whose solution can be calculated directly. We evaluate our attack on various benchmark
graph datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that, compared to state-of-the-art attack,
our attack can achieve higher attack success rate and has a 10-100x speedup when attacking
two-layer GNNs. Moreover, our attack is also very effective to attack multi-layer GNNs.
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